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Phys. Rev. A 67, 022311 (2003) [5 pages]

Efficiency and formalism of quantum games

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Chiu Fan Lee* and Neil F. Johnson
Centre for Quantum Computation and Physics Department, Clarendon Laboratory, Oxford University, Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3PU, United Kingdom

Received 2 August 2002; published 28 February 2003

We show that quantum games are more efficient than classical games and provide a saturated upper bound for this efficiency. We also demonstrate that the set of finite classical games is a strict subset of the set of finite quantum games. Our analysis is based on a rigorous formulation of quantum games, from which quantum versions of the minimax theorem and the Nash equilibrium theorem can be deduced.

© 2003 The American Physical Society

URL:
http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.67.022311
DOI:
10.1103/PhysRevA.67.022311
PACS:
03.67.-a, 02.50.Le

*Electronic address: c.lee1@physics.ox.ac.uk

Electronic address: n.johnson@physics.ox.ac.uk