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Phys. Rev. A 60, 2595–2598 (1999)

Comment on “Nonlocality, counterfactuals, and quantum mechanics”

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Henry P. Stapp
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, University of California at Berkely, Berkeley, California 94720

Received 18 May 1998; revised 13 July 1999; published in the issue dated September 1999

A recent proof [H. P. Stapp, Am. J. Phys. 65, 300 (1997)], formulated in the symbolic language of modal logic, claims to show that contemporary quantum theory, viewed as a set of rules that allow us to calculate statistical predictions among certain kinds of observations, cannot be imbedded in any rational framework that conforms to the principles that (1) the experimenters’ choices of which experiments they will perform can be considered to be free choices, (2) outcomes of measurements are unique, and (3) the free choices just mentioned have no backward-in-time effects of any kind. This claim is similar to Bell’s theorem, but much stronger, because no reality assumption alien to quantum philosophy is used. The paper being commented on [W. Unruh, Phys. Rev. A 59, 126 (1999)] argues that some such reality assumption has been “smuggled” in. That argument is examined here and shown, I believe, to be defective.

© 1999 The American Physical Society

URL:
http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.60.2595
DOI:
10.1103/PhysRevA.60.2595
PACS:
03.65.Bz

See Also

Original Article: W. Unruh, Nonlocality, counterfactuals, and quantum mechanics, Phys. Rev. A 59, 126 (1999).