Phys. Rev. A 59, 3301–3319 (1999)Estimates for practical quantum cryptographyReceived 3 June 1998; published in the issue dated May 1999 In this paper I present a protocol for quantum cryptography which is secure against attacks on individual signals. It is based on the Bennett-Brassard protocol of 1984. The security proof is complete as far as the use of single photons as signal states is concerned. Emphasis is placed on the practicability of the resulting protocol. For each run of the quantum key distribution the security statement gives the probability of a successful key generation and the probability for an eavesdropper’s knowledge, measured as change in Shannon entropy, to be below a specified maximal value. © 1999 The American Physical Society URL:
http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.59.3301
DOI:
10.1103/PhysRevA.59.3301
PACS:
03.67.Dd, 03.65.Bz, 42.79.Sz
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